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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a broad overview of the opportunities and challenges facing 
global climate change mitigation policy ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference 
in Copenhagen in December 2009. It begins with a brief review of the technological 
options for mitigating climate change by reducing, and substituting for, the use of 
fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). It then summarises the economic case for climate 
change mitigation, set out in the 2007 Stern Review. The paper then looks at how the 
implementation of climate policy measures to meet emissions reduction targets has so 
far had limited success, with worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases growing by 
38% between 1992 and 2007. A critique is then provided of the theoretical framing of 
current climate policies, arguing that a more integrated, long-term approach may be 
needed, in order to inform the decisions of economic actors in the face of high levels 
of risk and uncertainty. New economic ideas are then reviewed which aim to provide 
a more radical re-framing of the steps needed for a transition to a low carbon 
economy. These include a ‘green fiscal stimulus’ or ‘green new deal’, a focus on 
reducing emissions upstream at the production end rather than downstream at the 
consumption end, and challenging the accepted economic growth paradigm. Finally, it 
is argued that high levels of political will, technological innovation, institutional 
change, business leadership and citizen engagement will be needed to put the world 
on a pathway to a sustainable and prosperous low-carbon future. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing scientific evidence of the likely severe impacts and consequences of 
human-induced climate change is set out in the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007). However, the response by 
national and international policy-makers is struggling to address the global and inter-
connected nature of the challenge of climate change mitigation, with (at the time of 
writing) hopes hanging in the balance of achieving a comprehensive and stringent 
agreement at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009.  This 
paper sets out the main technological, economic and policy responses so far, arguing 
that, though progress has been made, this has been constrained by the actions of 
players with vested interests in maintaining current systems, and by ideological 
commitments to free-market based solutions. The severe challenge of setting the 
world on a pathway to a low carbon transition, whilst enabling economic development 
in developing countries, suggests that more radical approaches may be needed to 
overcome these difficulties. 
 
2. Climate change mitigation options 
In summary, rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases (GHG) have resulted from human-induced emissions, particularly 
from the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) for energy, transport and 
manufacturing uses, and from deforestation and other land use changes. These rising 
concentrations trap heat in the atmosphere and so alter the energy balance at the 
earth’s surface, leading to rising temperatures, rising sea levels and other physical 
impacts. These changes lead to feedbacks affecting the energy balance, e.g. cloud 
cover, and the further emissions of greenhouse gases, such as methane from warming 
permafrost, that make exact predictions of future levels of warming difficult. 
Nevertheless, advanced climate systems models predict mean global temperature rises 
of 1.7-6.4°C by 2100, if past emissions trends continue. This is supported by evidence 
of a 0.7°C mean temperature rise over the last century, and discernible human 
influences on temperature increases, melting polar ice and glaciers, and increased 
frequency of extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007). 
The challenge of mitigating the impacts of climate change thus focuses on efforts to 
reduce human emissions of GHGs from fossil fuel burning, deforestation and land use 
change. In this paper, we focus on reducing emissions from activities that have largely 
relied on fossil fuel burning. This is so challenging because these activities have 
contributed to the large increase in human wellbeing in industrialised countries whilst, 
because of increasing returns to the adoption of technologies and associated 
institutional rule systems, human societies are now ‘locked-in’ to these high carbon 
systems (Unruh, 2000). To avoid the worst impacts of climate change whilst 
maintaining and enhancing human wellbeing requires a transition to a low carbon 
development path. 
A low carbon path will require the adoption of a range of energy efficiency 
improvements in delivery of energy services for households, businesses and transport, 
and the further development and adoption of a range of low carbon energy supply 
technologies. These are likely to include a number of renewable sources of electricity 
and heat generation, such as wind power, solar photovoltaics, solar thermal electric 
power, sustainably sourced biomass, wave and tidal power, as well as next generation 
nuclear power, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) from coal and gas-fired 
electricity generation plants. Rather than a single ‘silver bullet’ technological solution, 
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a large number of mitigation ‘wedges’ from the large-scale deployment of many or all 
of these technologies are likely to be needed to achieve significant levels of emissions 
reductions by 2050 (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). The International Energy Agency 
has examined scenarios for reducing global CO2 emissions by 50% to below 20 Gt 
CO2 by 2050, identifying the wedges needed relative to a ‘business-as-usual’ 
emissions trajectory (IEA, 2008). They confirm that significant mitigation wedges 
would be needed from the power generation, transport, industry and buildings sectors, 
each of which would require contributions from a number of low-carbon technology 
options (see Figure 1). The implementation of many of these options will give rise to 
huge technical and political challenges, with advocates both in favour and against 
particular technological solutions (e.g. Romm, 2006; Mackay, 2009; Giddens, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mitigation wedges for IEA ‘Blue Map’ mitigation scenario (based on IEA, 2008) 
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3. Economic case for climate change mitigation 
In order to inform action on climate change, in 2006, the UK Government 
commissioned Sir Nicholas Stern, former Chief Economist at the World Bank, to 
review the economics of climate change. The resulting Stern Review (Stern, 2007) 
laid out the economic case for government action, arguing that climate change 
represents the “greatest market failure the world has ever seen”.  
However, as Stern recognised, the economic case on its own is unlikely to stimulate 
action to mitigate climate change, as there are social and ethical issues that also need 
to be addressed. Climate change results from the externality associated with 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, i.e. costs that are not paid by those who create the 
emissions. It has a number of features that distinguish it from other social and 
environmental problems: 
• Mitigating climate change is a global public good (i.e. the benefits of 
mitigation accrue to everyone on the planet and can not be bought by any 
individual at the expense of others); 
• Impacts are long-term and persistent; 
• Uncertainties and risks are pervasive; and 
• Risk of major, irreversible change with non-marginal economic effects. 
 
Hence, questions arise of equitable sharing of the responsibility for past emissions 
and the costs of achieving a low-carbon transition, both between richer and poorer 
countries and between present and future generations. The above features also imply 
that some standard tools of economic analysis, such as cost-benefit analysis, are 
limited in their usefulness, since they assume only marginal changes. The issue of the 
appropriate rate for discounting future costs and benefits also proved to be 
controversial, with Stern and colleagues arguing that standard treatments of 
discounting are inappropriate for comparing potential future mitigation pathways 
(Dietz et al., 2007). 
Whilst not undertaking a single global cost-benefit analysis to calculate the optimal 
level of climate change mitigation, Stern used a number of different economic tools to 
perform separate calculation of costs and benefits. This approach has been criticised 
both by neo-classical economists for a lack of rigour (Nordhaus, 2008) and by 
ecological economists for still retaining a number of debatable assumptions (Spash, 
2008). To calculate the economic costs of climate change impacts, Stern used simple 
‘integrated assessment models’, giving equal weight to impacts in poorer countries 
and on future generations. These models include impacts for which there is a ‘market’ 
value, such as agriculture and food supplies, due to changes in crop patterns, energy 
use, due to additional cooling requirements, and coastal zones, e.g. impacts on 
fisheries; ‘non-market’ impacts, including impacts on human health, e.g. increased 
prevalence of diseases and impacts on natural ecosystems; and ‘system change’ 
impacts, such as higher levels of conflict and migration. Stern argued that the likely 
annual social and economics costs of the impacts of climate change would be in the 
range 5-20% of global GDP, now and forever. 
In order to calculate the economic costs of climate change mitigation, Stern used 
both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ models. Bottom-up economic analyses incorporate a 
range of low-carbon technological options, and assume that the costs of these options 
fall with their implementation as a result of learning effects and economies of scale 
(IEA, 2000). They then calculate the costs of a low-carbon pathway, compared to the 
costs of a ‘business-as-usual’ pathway, with little or no consideration of 
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macroeconomic factors. Bottom-up modelling by Prof. Dennis Anderson for the Stern 
Review calculated that, to reduce global emissions by 33% to 18 GtCO2e by 2050, 
the addition annual cost of following this low-carbon pathway would rise from 
$134bn in 2015 to $930bn in 2050. Assuming continuing high levels of economic 
growth over this period, this would imply that the costs of mitigation would be equal 
to 1% of global GDP by 2050. Top-down economic analysis uses macroeconomic 
models of the global economy, with a relatively small number of regions and 
economic sectors. These models incorporate the implications of changes in 
investment patterns on wider economic activity and most, but not all, models assume 
a ‘general equilibrium’ framework. They calculate that stabilisation of GHG 
concentrations at 450-550 ppm CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalent) implies mitigation 
costs of 1-2% of global GDP per year by 2050. Hence, both bottom-up technology-
rich and top-down macroeconomic modelling suggest that the annual costs of climate 
change mitigation would be around 1-2% of global GDP by 2050. On this basis, Stern 
concluded that there is a strong economic case for undertaking mitigation, as the costs 
are likely to be much lower than the costs of the impacts of climate change. Stern 
argued that governments should aim to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) levels in the 
atmosphere at between 450 and 550 ppm CO2 equivalent. A review for the Australian 
Government in 2007 by eminent economist Ross Garnaut came to similar conclusions 
(Garnaut, 2007). 
Stern (2007) identified three complementary policy areas as necessary to deliver 
timely, effective and economically efficient climate change mitigation: 
• carbon pricing, through taxes or tradable permit schemes; 
• increasing support for R&D, demonstration projects and early stage 
commercialisation of clean technologies; and 
• measures to overcome institutional and other non-market barriers to 
deployment of energy efficiency and low carbon measures. 
 
Based on the scale of low carbon R&D and deployment needed, Stern 
recommended that deployment incentives for low-emission technologies should 
increase two to five times globally from current levels of $33bn to reach $65-150bn, 
and that global public energy R&D funding should double, to around $20bn, for the 
development of a diverse portfolio of technologies. This level of support is needed to 
bridge the gap between the current high costs of many low carbon options and the 
current high carbon alternatives. The deployment support would enable the low 
carbon options to benefit from learning, scale and adaptation effects, so reducing their 
unit costs. These effects are usually analysed in the form of learning or experience 
curves (IEA, 2000). Analysis of past cost reductions for energy technologies has 
typically shown empirical learning rates of 10-25%, meaning that a 10-25% reduction 
in unit costs results from a doubling of cumulative deployment (Macdonald and 
Schrattenholzer, 2001). Hence, as shown in Figure 2, early deployment support would 
be expected to reduce the cost of low carbon options, so that they would become cost 
competitive with current technologies, under the general support of a carbon price, 
provided by a carbon tax or trading scheme. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between carbon pricing and deployment support (based on Stern, 2007) 
 
 
4. Implementation of climate policy measures 
The first internationally agreed targets for climate change mitigation were those set by 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto Protocol set targets for industrialised countries only 
to achieve an average 5% reduction in GHG emissions by 2008-12, relative to 1990 
levels. The Protocol came into force in 2005, with ratification by the Russian 
government, following that of all other industrialised countries, except the U.S.A. and 
Australia*. Some countries, including the UK and Germany, are on track to meet their 
Kyoto targets, at least partly due to the side effects of non-climate-related policies, 
such as the dash for gas-fired electricity generation in the UK following liberalisation 
of electricity markets. However, many other countries, including Canada and Spain, 
are highly unlikely to achieve their Kyoto targets, and, overall, worldwide GHG 
emissions grew by 38% between 1992 and 2007.  
The Kyoto Protocol also provided for carbon emissions trading between 
governments and by firms, designed to stimulate the lowest-cost emissions reductions 
which could then be traded within overall caps. The European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which began operation in 2005, followed this cap-and-trade approach in 
order to help the EU meet its target of 8% reduction in emissions by 2008-12 from 
1990 levels. This covers emissions from power generation and energy-intensive 
industries totalling around 40% of total EU emissions. The Waxman-Markey Bill, 
which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in June 2009, but (at the time 
of writing) had yet to be agreed by the U.S. Senate, would set up a similar cap-and-
trade for the U.S. to achieve emissions reductions of 17% by 2020 and 83% by 2050, 
relative to 2005 levels. 
                                                 
*
 Australia later ratified the protocol in 2007. 
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The policy areas identified by Stern are beginning to be reflected in policies of the 
European Union member states. These are seen as forming part of a “new, green 
industrial revolution” (Milliband, 2007; Barroso, 2007). Such calls have recently been 
echoed by the new US Secretary of Energy (Chu, 2009). In December 2008, the 
European Council of Ministers agreed on an Energy and Climate Policy package, both 
for domestic action and as a basis for negotiation at the Copenhagen meeting. This 
package aims to address environmental targets, whilst, at the same time, contributing 
to ensuring security of energy supply for EU countries. The main aims of this package 
are to achieve by 2020: 
• a 20% reduction in carbon emissions, with a promise of a 30% reduction in 
carbon emissions by 2020, if there is an international agreement at the COP15 
meeting in Copenhagen; 
• 20% of final energy from renewables; and 
• a 20% improvement in energy efficiency.  
 
In July 2009, the Major Economies Forum, including China, India, Brazil and the 
G8 countries, recognised that, to avoid the most serious impacts, the increase in global 
average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2°C. This is 
likely to require atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to stabilise below 
400 ppm CO2equiv (Meinshausen, 2006; Anderson and Bows, 2008). Even for a very 
small chance of exceeding 4ºC rise by 2100, global emissions need to peak by 2016 
and then reduce by around 3% per year to 2100 (Committee on Climate Change, 
2008). This implies global GHG emissions will need to be reduced by 50% by 2050, 
from current 40 GtCO2e to 20-24 GtCO2e by 2050. Assuming fair allocation of these 
emissions amongst 9 billion people by 2050, this implies a share of 2.1 to 2.6 tCO2e 
per person. Hence, if these emissions are shared equitably between countries, this 
implies that at least 80% reductions are required by industrialised countries. 
Emissions reductions of these orders of magnitude will require dramatic 
transformation of systems of production and consumption, involving different 
possible transition pathways to low carbon power generation, transport and energy use 
systems (Foxon et al., 2009). The UK government has committed itself to a legally-
binding target of reducing its GHG emissions by 80% by 2050, from 1990 levels, with 
a new institution, an expert-led Committee on Climate Change to recommend 5-
yearly budgets to put the UK on track to achieving this target (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2008, 2009). Other members of the G20 group of major economies, 
including the U.S., are considering bringing in similar legally-binding targets. 
The main policy instruments to achieve these targets being applied in European and 
other industrialised countries are Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS), and R&D and 
price-support measures for deployment of new renewable and other low-carbon 
energy technologies. As well as stimulating the deployment of existing low-carbon 
technologies and processes, these measures are intended to promote innovation and 
rapid take-up of low-carbon alternatives, such as wind power, solar photovoltaics, 
nuclear power, and carbon capture and storage (CCS), which are currently more 
expensive than the dominant alternatives of using coal and gas for electricity 
generation. Complementary measures to improve the building stock, in order to 
reduce the heat demand by homes and businesses, have received more attention in 
some countries, such as Germany, than others, such as the UK. 
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5. Critique of current policy approaches 
Unfortunately, as described above, current policy measures have so far had relatively 
little success in stimulating emissions reductions. Indeed, it is notable that the 2008-
09 economic recession has led to more rapid, though temporary, emissions reductions 
(Bowen et al., 2009b). We argue that this lack of success is at least partially the result 
of the theoretical framing of current climate policies, which draw on a range of 
theoretical approaches. This leads to potential inconsistencies and arguably forms an 
inadequate basis for addressing long-term environmental problems, in which actors 
need to make decisions in the face of high levels of risk and uncertainty, both in 
relation to outcomes of current actions and the potential for the development of 
alternatives.  Table 1 outlines the main policy measures and their underlying framing. 
 
Policy area Theoretical 
framing 
Example policy Example target 
Carbon pricing Neo-classical 
economic theory 
EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
21% reduction in 
EU ETS sector 
emissions by 2020 
(compared to 2005) 
Support for R&D, 
demonstration 
projects and early 
commercialisation of 
clean technologies 
(Neo-classical) 
innovation theory/ 
(evolutionary) 
innovation 
systems theory 
Feed-in tariffs for 
renewable energy 
technologies in 
many EU countries 
20% share of final 
energy from 
renewables by 
2020 
Overcoming 
institutional and 
non-market barriers 
to deployment 
Institutional and 
behavioural 
economics 
Fiscal, regulatory 
or information 
incentives to take-
up (cost effective) 
energy efficiency 
improvements 
20% reduction in 
energy 
consumption by 
2020 
 
Table 1. Framing of current climate change mitigation policies 
 
As can be seen from the Table, these measures focus largely on the important issue 
of reducing emissions from energy supply and energy-intensive industries, which are 
within the scope of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. There is relatively little focus 
on wider systems of production and consumption, to stimulate a more general 
greening of these systems by creating space and incentives for eco-innovators and 
greening of markets. Whilst markets in tradable carbon permits are likely to have an 
important role to play, it may be argued that the wider greening of markets and other 
incentives to promote wide and deep low-carbon innovation are more important to 
achieving a long-run transition to a low carbon economy (Andersen and Foxon, 
2009). 
The rationale for carbon pricing comes from environmental economics. Here, a 
‘market failure’ is identified in relation to the existence of negative environmental 
externalities, i.e. environmental by-products of consuming or producing activities that 
affect third parties but are not reflected in market transactions and prices (Pigou, 
1932). In this case, the emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases from energy 
production and other industrial activities has historically been the unpriced 
externality. Arguably the simplest way to price carbon emissions would be to impose 
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a carbon tax on activities leading to emissions. However, taxes tend to be politically 
highly unpopular and there are concerns about the threat to international 
competitiveness of industries faced with taxes, especially if there is the potential for 
firms to relocate production to countries without a carbon tax (so-called ‘carbon 
leakage’). Efforts to introduce a European carbon tax in the early 1990s failed to 
gather enough political support to be enacted.  
The alternative pricing mechanism is to impose an emissions trading scheme. 
Following the success of an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. to reduce emissions 
of sulphur dioxide from coal-fired power stations and other industrial firms, the legal 
basis for emissions trading was agreed in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which set carbon 
emissions reduction targets for industrialised countries. The European Union 
subsequently agreed a carbon Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which began with a 
first period in 2005 to 2007, to enable learning, followed by a second period covering 
2008 to 2012, to coincide with the commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. As 
part of the Climate Policy package agreed in December 2008, the EU agreed that the 
third phase of the ETS would run from 2013 to 2020. The ETS is a ‘cap-and-trade’ 
system, setting an overall emissions cap for firms included in the scheme, with 
permits tradable between firms that are likely to exceed their allocation and firms that 
have spare credits. The economic rationale is that this enables the system to find the 
least-cost reduction opportunities. The political and competitiveness concerns were 
also eased by having a high proportion of free allocation of permits to firms. 
However, the environmental effectiveness of the scheme is determined by the level of 
the overall cap. In Phase One of the EU ETS, the cap set by the sum of the national 
allocations was too high to require emissions reductions much beyond business-as-
usual, leading to a collapse in the price of permits in early 2007. The free allocation of 
permits also led to ‘windfall’ profits for electricity companies, who were given 
permits for free, but received the benefits of the permit prices being included in 
electricity costs to consumers. For Phase Two, the European Commission required 
countries to impose stronger caps, though the permit price began to fall again in late 
2008, as a result of reductions in energy demand due to the economic recession. In 
Phase Three, the allocation of permits will increasingly move from free allocation to 
auctioning, though one of the concessions to the East European coal industry was that 
it should continue to receive a proportion of free allowances. Though the new 
agreement for Phase Three from 2013 to 2020 gives a certain level of certainty to 
firms that there will be a carbon price in this period, no mechanism was agreed for 
setting a floor or ceiling to the carbon price. This uncertainty in the level of the carbon 
price means that, on its own, it is unlikely to stimulate significant levels of investment 
leading to innovation in low-carbon technologies and processes. Thus, a carbon price 
is a necessary but not sufficient driver of low-carbon innovation (since without a 
carbon price, the economic ‘benefit’ of unpriced emissions to firms would be likely to 
override any positive incentives for low-carbon innovation.) The plan to introduce a 
similar carbon trading scheme in the U.S. under the Waxman-Markey Bill looks set to 
reproduce many of the same advantages and drawbacks of the EU scheme. 
The rationale for increasing support for R&D, demonstration projects and early 
stage commercialisation of clean technologies comes from innovation theory (Foxon, 
2003). The economic rationale is that, since new knowledge is often easy to copy, 
innovators cannot always appropriate the full benefits of their investment in 
knowledge creation, and so private firms may lack the incentives necessary to 
undertake socially efficient levels of innovative activity. In addition, historical 
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evidence shows that the costs of new technologies typically reduce along learning 
curves as they are introduced into the market.  
The rationale for measures to overcome institutional and other non-market barriers 
to deployment comes mainly from institutional and behavioural economics. It is 
observed that firms and consumers do not act as purely rational economic agents, but 
their behavioural is influenced by the social and institutional context in which they 
act. The factors that prevent purely rational behaviour are often referred to as barriers, 
but they reflect these more complex drivers of behavioural change. For example, it is 
observed that many energy efficiency opportunities, such as installing wall or loft 
insulation, are not taken up, despite the fact that the initial capital costs would be 
quickly paid back by reduced energy bills, implying that they would be taken up by 
economically rational actors. In this case, the barriers could relate to the persistence of 
individuals’ ‘habits’ preventing change, such as the behavioural predisposition to 
consider capital and running costs separately (Marechal, 2009), or to the fact that 
culturally embedded patterns of behaviour are slow to change (Nye et al., 2009). 
Similarly, firms may not invest in potentially economic low-carbon innovation 
opportunities, because these conflict with existing routines that firms follow based on 
their historical experiences (Unruh, 2000). 
Thus, it is noticeable that the rationales for the different types of mitigation policy 
instrument come from different areas of economic theory. In particular, there is an 
absence of a holistic framework for understanding how these different areas could 
come together to achieve a transition to a low-carbon economy. Of course, it could be 
argued that such a piecemeal approach is the only pragmatic possibility. However, the 
relatively slow pace of mitigation achieved so far, and the difficulties in reaching 
agreement at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference on anything like the 
emissions reduction levels that the climate science says would be necessary to limit 
global temperature rises to the 2°C target, suggest that a more radical re-framing of 
the problem may be necessary. 
 
6. New economic thinking for climate change mitigation 
Whilst most observers agree that some mechanism to price carbon emissions, either 
through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade emissions scheme, is a necessary component 
of a climate change mitigation policy package, some have argued recently that more 
radical measures are likely to be needed to stimulate a global transition to a low-
carbon economy. This would require global GHG emissions to peak within the next 
10 years and then reduce by around 4% per annum. In order to enable economic 
development in developing countries, these countries would be required to decouple 
their rate of emissions increase from continued economic growth, so that rich and 
poor countries would equalise their emissions at around 2 tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
per person by 2050. Debates centre on whether this can be achieved by a 
strengthening of the three existing types of policy instrument, or whether a more 
radical re-framing is necessary to achieve a more coherent policy mix. Amongst the 
approaches being discussed are a ‘green fiscal stimulus’ or ‘green new deal’, a focus 
on reducing emissions upstream at the production end rather than downstream at the 
consumption end, and challenging the accepted economic growth paradigm. 
The 2008-09 global economic crisis has created additional difficulties in moving 
towards a low carbon economy, particularly in relation to whether the levels of private 
investment funding needed will be available. However, it has also been argued by 
some that this represents an opportunity for simultaneously addressing economic and 
environmental concerns. Most industrialised and rapidly developing countries have 
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adopted a public fiscal stimulus package, parts of which are focussed on investment in 
green technologies and infrastructure. For example, South Korea is focussing around 
80% of its overall fiscal stimulus on green technology and manufacturing, China is 
investing heavily in the installation of large wind farms and solar photovoltaics, and 
the U.S. is supporting the renewal of its electricity grid and moves towards a ‘smart 
grid’ that would enable more intelligent management of demand and integration of 
intermittent renewable energy sources. However, these and other countries are also 
investing in support of old, high carbon industries, such as car manufacturing, without 
necessarily requiring firms to move more rapidly towards developing low carbon 
vehicles. Nicholas Stern and colleagues proposed that a ‘green fiscal stimulus’ 
(Bowen et al., 2009a) of the order of 0.8% of global GDP, or $400 billion of extra 
public spending worldwide on ‘green’ measures over the next two years would be 
appropriate. 
Others have suggested that a green fiscal stimulus needs to be complemented by a 
wider range of institutional and regulatory changes to promote a more rapid low 
carbon transition. This is referred to as a ‘Green New Deal’, after President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, which created millions of jobs and helped the 
U.S. to recover from the Great Depression. As part of its Green Economy Initiative, 
UNEP (the United Nations Environment Programme), in collaboration with a wide 
range of international partners and experts, is examining the conditions and 
requirements for a ‘Global Green New Deal’ (UNEP, 2009). This builds on a report 
that it commissioned from the respected environmental economist Edward Barbier 
which sets out the economic case for action (Barbier, 2009). The three broad 
objectives proposed in the March 2009 UNEP policy brief are: 
(1) Make a major contribution to reviving the world economy, saving and creating 
jobs, and protecting vulnerable groups; 
(2) Reduce carbon dependency and ecosystem degradation, putting economies on 
a path to clean and stable development; and 
(3) Further sustainable and inclusive economic growth, achievement of the 
Millenium Development Goals, and end extreme poverty by 2015. 
 
UNEP argues that this will require co-ordinated government action in three areas: 
(a) a ‘green’ fiscal stimulus of the order of 1% of global GDP ($750 billion) over 
the next two years, or around a quarter of the total size of the fiscal stimulus 
packages currently proposed by the G20 countries; 
(b) domestic policy reforms to enable the success of green investment within 
domestic economies; and 
(c) reforms to international policy architecture and international co-ordination to 
enable and support national initiatives. 
 
The ‘green’ stimulus would cover investment in energy efficiency of buildings, 
greener vehicles and transport infrastructure, renewable energy projects, ‘smarter’ 
electricity grids, and more sustainable agriculture and freshwater systems. A range of 
domestic policy interventions would aim to ensure a “level playing field” to enable 
the investments in green sectors to take hold and flourish as commercially viable 
businesses. Reforms to the international policy architecture would aim to provide the 
framework for a transition towards a more sustainable economic system, including 
action in the areas of international trade, international aid, a global carbon market, 
global markets for ecosystem services, development and transfer of technology, and 
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further international co-ordination to enable the participation of both industrialised 
and developing countries in the global Green New Deal initiative. 
In July 2008, a group of leading UK economists and environmentalists 
independently proposed a ‘Green New Deal’ to tackle the financial, energy and 
climate crises (Green New Deal Group, 2008). Their programme aims to combine 
stabilisation in the short term with longer-term restructuring of the financial, taxation 
and energy systems. They set out an even more radical programme of action, 
including: 
• Executing a bold new vision for a low-carbon energy system making ‘every 
building a power station’ through a $80 billion programme of investment in 
energy efficiency and local renewable electricity generation; 
• Creating and training a ‘carbon army’ of workers to create the human 
resources for a vast environmental reconstruction programme; 
• Ensuring that fossil fuel prices are high enough to create the economic 
incentive to drive efficiency and bring alternative fuels to the market, and 
establishment of an Oil Legacy Fund, paid for by a windfall tax on the profits 
of oil and gas companies; 
• Minimising corporate tax evasion by clamping down on tax havens and 
corporate financial reporting; 
• Re-regulating the domestic financial system to ensure the creation of money at 
low rates of interest, combined with tighter controls on lending and the 
generation of credit; and 
• The breaking-up of large banks and other financial institutions seen as being 
“too big to be allowed to fail” in the current economic crisis. 
 
These types of reforms would obviously be opposed by those firms and institutions 
that perceived them as a threat to their strategic position or interests. Some observers 
have expressed concerns that, with the immediate financial crisis having been averted 
by government and central bank actions, such as higher public deficits and the 
creation of additional money supply through ‘quantitative easing’, the incentives for 
governments to undertake these types of wider institutional and regulatory reforms 
has weakened. The likelihood of their adoption will depend on continued public 
pressure and on how the state of the global and national economies evolve over the 
coming years. 
Finally, the question has been raised of whether a sustainable, low carbon economy 
is compatible with current patterns of ever-increasing material consumption and the 
focus on achieving economic growth as the primary policy objective in industrialised 
countries (Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009). The recent report of the Stiglitz Commission 
to the President of France, chaired by Economics Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, 
noted the evidence that, after basic needs have been met, further increases in 
consumption do not bring systematic improvement in people’s reported happiness 
(Stiglitz et al., 2009). The Stiglitz Commission argued that policy in industrialised 
countries should focus more on supporting the achievement of desired goals such as 
high levels of employment, reducing social inequalities and personal wellbeing 
through fulfilling social interactions, using a wider range of indicators than just GDP 
growth. 
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7. Towards achieving global climate change mitigation 
This paper has examined the opportunities and challenges of moving to a low carbon 
economy to mitigate the severe threat posed by human-induced climate change. 
Whilst there is some agreement on the outline of the steps needed – to put a price on 
carbon emissions; to promote innovation and deployment of low carbon technologies; 
and to overcome institutional and non-market barriers to adoption of energy 
efficiency and low carbon measures – there is much less agreement on the technical 
and economic feasibility and political acceptability of these steps. 
The mainstream political position has been to work in incremental steps to 
implement changes that will gradually reorientate economic decisions of firms and 
individuals in low carbon directions, whilst setting stronger long-term emissions 
reduction targets. Thus, the broad outlines of the proposed deal at the UN Climate 
Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 are expected to be: 
(1) Goals for reductions of GHG emissions by industrialised countries in absolute 
terms for 2020 and 2050; 
(2) Goals for reduction in GHG emissions by developing countries relative to 
their expected increases in GDP, for 2020 and 2050; 
(3) Funds provided by industrialised countries for transfer of low carbon 
technologies to developing countries; 
(4) Funds provided by industrialised and rapidly developing countries for 
adaptation to impacts of climate change in poorer countries; and 
(5) Regulatory and/or financial incentives for avoiding deforestation in 
developing countries. 
The details, though, of the levels of emissions reduction commitments by individual 
countries and of the financial transfers between industrialised and developing 
countries to promote mitigation and adaptation are highly contentious. 
Among the main instruments for achieving these targets are expected to be increases 
in the scope and coverage of national and international carbon markets, such as the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, and further regulatory and financial incentives 
for the innovation and deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as renewable 
energy sources, electric vehicles and carbon capture and storage (CCS) of emissions 
from coal- and gas-fired electricity generation. However, as we have seen, the initial 
implementation of carbon markets in the European Union has not been without 
problems. Whilst some argue that these initial difficulties will be overcome as more 
experience with carbon markets is gained and stronger caps are imposed in future 
phases, others argue that this type of ‘downstream’ trading system is not likely to be 
the most effective mechanism for achieving high levels of emissions reductions. This 
is because there are a very large number of sources covered by this type of scheme. 
Hence an ‘upstream’ carbon trading system, based on a smaller number of sources at 
or closer to primary energy production, such as oil refining and electricity generation 
has been argued for, as part of a more streamlined policy approach (Tickell, 2008). 
The scale of the transformation of systems of production and consumption to 
achieve a transition to low carbon economies at national and global levels has led 
some to argue that more radical approaches are needed. Proponents of a ‘green new 
deal’ have argued that both a larger green economic stimulus and significant 
institutional and regulatory changes are needed to address the inter-locking challenges 
of climate change, ecosystem degradation and economic credit crunch. Recently, the 
question has been raised of how compatible a sustainable, low carbon economy can be 
with current patterns of ever-increasing material consumption and focus on economic 
growth as the prime aim of policy. It is important that all these ideas are subject to 
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public debate and scrutiny, as whether a low carbon future is possible depends on 
people’s willingness to accept significant changes to current socio-economic systems 
and support for an alternative vision of a more equitable and maybe less materialistic 
world. In any case, it is clear that high levels of political will, technological 
innovation, institutional change, business leadership and citizen engagement will be 
needed to deliver and successfully implement the current and further global 
agreements to put the world on a pathway to a sustainable and prosperous low-carbon 
future. 
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